AES software integrity assurance

I recently received an invitation from a politician, through a third party, to present the vulnerabilities of the automated election system (AES), in particular, the precinct count optical scan (PCOS), renamed vote counting machine (VCM). I was informed that the politician received an offer of sure win from an “operator.” The politician is concerned that the AES will be rigged in the 2016 elections to favor some candidates. The invitation remains open and I have no way of verifying the information.

I have also been asked what assurance the Commission on Elections (Comelec) can give the candidates and voters that the AES will be secured from tampering. Another question raised: How can Comelec assure stakeholders that the VCM executable code is generated from the source code reviewed by interested political parties and group and by SLI Global, the international certification entity engaged by Comelec?