AS early as August 19, 1945, just as World War 2 was drawing to a close, the US crafted its post-war strategic plan for the control of the China Sea for political and economic motives envisioning the military role of the Philippines, among other sites considered “strategic.”

As defined by the US its strategy in the Pacific would revolve “around a center line running north to the equator, through the Hawaiian Islands, the Marshalls, the Carolines, the Marianas and the Philippines, with the Northern flank protected by the Aleutians and the Kuriles and the southern flank by a mixture of islands.” This gave birth to naval and military bases such as Clark and Subic to be maintained by the US to assume responsibility for “keeping peace” in the Pacific and insure not only the freedom of navigation to protect the unhampered flow of such items as energy from the Middle East which supplied a substantial requirement of that country. It was assumed that this would also guarantee the rapid expansion of American economic interests and political influence in the area. The Seventh Fleet was intended to check any country or power challenging the American vision.

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