Writ of kalikasan vs. Rizal mines scrapped

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THE Supreme Court dismissed a petition for a writ of kalikasan against several mining companies operating within Antipolo City and Teresa town in Rizal province.


In a full court decision, signed by Clerk of Court Enriqueta Vidal, the court junked the petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan filed by a certain Eleuterio Yim of Mea Suarez Leis Sierra Yim Inc. against Cemex Phils. Group of Co., Solid Cement Corp., Island Quarry and Aggregates Corp. and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, pursuant to Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 7, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.

The court, however, explained that it was dismissed “without prejudice to the filing of any appropriate civil, criminal or administrative remedies warranted by relevant circumstances.”

Yim alleged in his petition that respondent companies are engaged in illegal bulldozing, illegal quarrying and blasting and illegal surveying, activities that have caused flashfloods, landslides, environmental degradation, fish-killing and contamination of the Tagbac River and multiple sicknesses and diseases.

The petitioner demanded an explanation from the public respondents (local authorities) why they did not stop, reprimand, sanction or charge the private respondents for such violations.

In its ruling, the high tribunal held that that “|the] petition is insufficient in substance.”

According to the court, Yim was not shown to be a real party in interest and he was not shown to be duly authorized by the petitioner company to file the petition.

“The municipality of Teresa, Rizal was not made a respondent despite the allegation that the municipality was affected by the illegal operations and activities of the private respondents,” the court said.

The High Court also observed that the office of the solicitor general, as counsel for Environment department, was not furnished a copy of the petition required under the rules of court.

It also held that “[the] petition lacks the allegation and showing of an extreme urgency, and of the petitioner suffering grave injustice and irreparable injury, to justify the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order [under the law].”