BY the end of the ongoing 18th National Congress of the CPC, China will have unveiled its new generation of leaders. By that time, the reshuffling of the Party’s most senior positions — including on the Politburo Standing Committee and on the more than 300-member Central Committee — will be finalized.

As a result of Chongqing Party chief Bo Xilai’s dismissal and the subsequent political fallout, competition over the top positions was more visible to the public and perhaps more heated than any transition in the two decades that the transitions have taken place.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Standing Committee has experienced significant fluctuations in its authority. Under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the Standing Committee was often dominated by a single politician or was superseded by a few Party elders.

Consequently, the committee’s actual decision-making capacity was often limited. It was not until the early 1990s, after Deng’s retirement, that the Standing Committee was restored as the country’s highest political body, that the generational leadership transition was set up and that the rule of an individual gave way to a collective-based model of rule.

In order to preserve internal stability in the new model, the Party has sought to balance representation of the different factions and interests in the top echelon of leaders. It has also had to ensure that consensus can be reached in all decision-making to prevent factional politics and power struggles from disrupting the entire Party and political system. The shape of the Standing Committee and other decision-making bodies is a result of these needs for consensus, and their ability to withstand intense debate in part explains how, despite the political upheaval of the past decades, the Party’s system has remained largely intact.

Nevertheless, the intense competition this year—particularly in the wake of the Bo incident—created opportunities for various factions, business groups and formerly quiet Party elders to step in and proffer their own candidates. With the competition heating up, and with the need to accommodate the different political forces, a few promising candidates who had built their careers more on performance than networks were pushed aside. For instance, it has already been suggested by a number of overseas rumor mills that Li Yuanchao, the head of the Organizational Department, and Wang Yang, the reform-minded Guangdong Party secretary, have been excluded from the final list of Standing Committee members.

In addition, separate from the Bo incident, the debate over political reform has apparently been renewed in public discourse, in academia and even within the Party itself. Essentially, the consensus-based model of rule inherently means that any attempts at meaningful reform will encounter strong resistance from both inside and outside the Party. This has allowed the Party to repeatedly delay much-desired political reform, which has accumulated powerful backers among the political and business elite. Considering the degree of support they will receive from conservative-minded figures, especially among the Party elders, conservative politicians will probably be in a better position than their reformist counterparts on the next Standing Committee. With pressure mounting for China to embark on its long-delayed path of reform, the probable shape of the next committee will be just one more barrier to meaningful change.

Still, rampant speculation that the number of Standing Committee members will be reduced from nine
to seven, in addition to persistent rumors in China, mean that the mystery shrouding the final list will not dissipate until the last minute. Nevertheless, Stratfor thought it would be useful to provide information on the candidates we believe are most likely to occupy seats on the next Standing Committee.

XI JINPING: Born in Shaanxi, Xi joined the Communist Party of China in 1974. He studied chemical engineering and humanities at Tsinghua University.

Regional Service: He served in Hebei, Fujian, Zhejiang and Shanghai.

Institutional/Personal Affiliation: Xi is a prominent “princeling” (a descendant of an influential communist official) and is considered a close ally of former President Jiang Zemin. He is an accepted candidate among various political players.

Notes: A princeling and scion of a powerful Communist Party family, Xi has balanced his political connections across factions and, unlike his predecessors, filled a political role with the Chinese armed forces early in his career. Xi has been groomed for the top position for nearly a decade, and although there were moments when it was unclear if he would ultimately succeed to the position of Party secretary and president, his position has been secure for the past two years, and since then, he has gradually taken on more responsibility and power. Like many of China’s top leaders, Xi’s strength is his connections. While his policy interests and direction are not entirely clear, Xi’s work experience in coastal provinces such as Zhejiang and Shanghai has given him the reputation of being relatively reform-minded. Lately, Xi has offered several signs that he may push for political and economic reform after assuming office.

LI KEQIANG: Born in Anhui, Li joined the CPC in 1976. He attended Beijing University and holds a doctorate in law and a master’s in economics.

Regional Service: He served in Anhui, Henan and Liaoning.

Institutional/Personal Affiliation: Li was a member of the Chinese Communist Youth League and is widely known to be close to President Hu Jintao.

Notes: Similar to Xi’s course, Li’s successor role was not attained without challenge. Considerably dependent on his close relationship with Hu and his background in the Chinese Communist Youth League, Li is widely considered to lack the strong character and charisma necessary for the premiership, but he is known for his ability to encourage and incorporate divergent opinions into the decision-making process. This had put Li into a disadvantageous position relative to Xi and even Wang Qishan in terms of economic policies — the primary purview of the premier. Because of his ties to Hu, Li is believed to share some of the populist policy agenda, with a focus on balancing social inequalities, regional development and facilitating reform in state-owned enterprises.
 
ZHANG DEJIANG: Born in Liaoning, Zhang joined the CPC in 1971. He studied at Yanbian University and Kim Il Sung University in North Korea.

Regional Service: He served in Jilin, Zhejiang, Guangdong and Chongqing.

Institutional/Personal Affiliation: Zhang is a longtime ally of Jiang and a princeling son of former People’s Liberation Army Maj. Gen. Zhang Zhiyi.

Notes: A Korean linguist, Zhang spent much of his early career in China’s northeast Jilin province. He has built a reputation for dealing with crises, including the 2003 SARS outbreak and his appointment to Chongqing after the ouster of Bo Xilai. Zhang has also been praised for his economic management during his tenure in Zhejiang and Guangdong. But Zhang is also a polarizing figure, gaining some of the highest marks from China’s political elite and engendering criticism from the grassroots for his iron-fisted management of social issues and public grievances. Zhang is perceived as a strong ally of Jiang, though following the SARS outbreak he was rumored to have developed closer ties with Hu.

His move to Chongqing and his rise in the Standing Committee reflect the continued moves by the elder statesman to influence Chinese politics.
 
WANG QISHAN: Born in Shanxi, Wang joined the CPC in 1983. He studied at Northwest University (Xian) and the Central Party School.

Regional Service: He served in Guangdong, Hainan and Beijing.

Institutional/Personal Affiliation: Wang is a princeling son whose one-time mentor was former Premier Zhu Rongji.

Notes: Wang spent the early years of his career in rural development and banking. He is known as a troubleshooter and crisis manager, and following in the footsteps of his mentor, Zhu, there are expectations that he may play an even stronger role in China’s economic management. Facing economic problems, Zhu took a heavy-handed approach in breaking some of the state monopolies and pushed reform in finance, trade and state-owned enterprise regulations. Because China is experiencing declining coastal exports, a growing asset bubble and resurgent state-owned monopolies, some are looking to Wang to intervene decisively in China’s economic development as well. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Wang has maintained good ties to the West, allowing him access to high-level foreign consultations.

ZHANG GAOLI: Born in Fujian, Zhang joined the CPC in 1973. He studied economics development at Xiamen University.

Regional Service: He served in Guangdong, Shandong and Tianjin.

Institutional/Personal Affiliation: Zhang is considered close to Jiang. He is also affiliated with the “oil clique” that includes Zhou Yongkang, Zeng Qinghong and He Guoqiang.

Notes: Zhang began his career in the Ministry of Petroleum and continues to retain ties with China’s powerful oil clique. His probable promotion to the Standing Committee is likely linked to his close ties to Jiang and his fairly uneventful track record in politics. Although Zhang oversaw some of the economic growth in Tianjin, he has maintained a fairly low profile and is considered mundane by the public. But in China’s consensus-based politics, Zhang’s lack of drama and his reputation for reliability — along with his ties to many prominent princelings — may end up being one of his strengths.
 
LIU YUNSHAN: Born in Shanxi, Liu joined the CPC in 1971. He attended Jining Normal School (Inner Mongolia) and the Central Party School.

Regional Service: He served in Inner Mongolia.

Institutional/Personal Affiliation: Although connected to the Chinese Communist Youth League, Liu generally defies a strong factional label and is accepted by former leaders such as Jiang, Zeng and even Li Peng.

Notes: Liu spent his early career in Inner Mongolia as a student, working for Xinhua, and in government and propaganda. Since 2007, Liu has served as head of the propaganda department, the Party’s most influential bureaucracy. Compared to other Standing Committee candidates, Liu has a rather simple resume. However, through his work in propaganda, he has accumulated enormous political capital, gaining him a position as an alternate member of the 14th CPC Central Committee at the age of 38. Largely labeled conservative minded due to his tenure in the propaganda arena, Liu is considered a standard Party bureaucrat-politician and has taken criticism for his rigid control over media. Nonetheless, his political capital as well as balanced factional background better position him in the leadership race. With the Party’s reported initiative to alleviate the role of propaganda in the composition of the Standing Committee, Liu is unlikely to occupy a role similar to his current one in propaganda.
 
LI YUANCHAO: Born in Jiangsu, Li joined the CPC in 1978. He attended Shanghai Normal University, Fudan University (where he studied mathematics), Beijing University and the Central Party School.
Regional Service: He served in Jiangsu.

Institutional/Personal Affiliation: Li is seen as a good balance between the princelings and the Chinese Communist Youth League, as well as other factions. He is well liked by Jiang, Zeng, Hu and Xi.

Notes: Widely accepted among different political factions and players with various political backgrounds, Li is perhaps among the least controversial candidates considered for a Standing Committee seat. In fact, his political career was set to soar before Tiananmen Square (Li was a student at Beijing University and young Party member at the time, and he was scrutinized by conservative Party elders for his sympathy toward the students in the Tiananmen incident). As head of the powerful Organizational Department since 2007, Li gained substantial influence in the composition of the Party’s cadre and thus accumulated significant political resources and connections.

Li is considered a reform-minded figure among the rising politicians, and he has long been considered the most secure candidate for the Standing Committee aside from Xi and Li Keqiang. However, since early October there have reportedly been some objections raised by some of the conservative Party elders.
 
WANG YANG: Born in Anhui, Wang joined the CPC in 1975. He studied at the Central Party School and University of Science and Technology of China (Anhui).

Regional Service: He served in Anhui, Chongqing and Guangdong.

Institutional/Personal Affiliation: Wang is affiliated with the Chinese Communist Youth League and is a close ally of Hu, but he is also reportedly well received by a few reformist politicians and elders, including Wen Jiabao and Wan Li.

Notes: Among the youngest candidates to the Standing Committee, Wang is known as a liberal, reform-minded politician. Wang’s political career gained momentum when he served as Party secretary of Guangdong province, the precursor of China’s coastal export economic model. During his time in Guangdong, Wang was frequently compared to Bo Xilai, whose Chongqing model focused on central planning and inland development. Both Bo and Wang were considered candidates for the Standing Committee, and Bo’s dismissal should have propelled Wang forward. But Wang’s reformist image and some controversial liberal attempts seemed to draw significant opposition among conservative elders and politicians. Moreover, unlike other contenders, who were sidetracked for being too old, the 57-year-old Wang could be pushed aside for his young age. It has been suggested that if Wang does not make the Standing Committee during the 18th Party Congress, he will be a top contender for a spot in five years.
 
YU ZHENGSHENG: Born in Zhejiang, Yu joined the CPC in 1964. He studied at the Harbin Institute of Military Engineering.

Regional Service: He served in Shandong, Hubei and Shanghai.

Institutional/Personal Affiliation: Yu is a princeling from a powerful family with a strong cross-factional network.

Notes: Enormous political capital, a powerful family background and an intensive personal network with ties to Xi, Jiang and Deng Xiaoping made Yu one of the strongest candidates for the Standing Committee. Yu is known for enduring a number of political crises. His influential role among Party elites, political reliability and perceived open-mindedness give him strong prospects for a senior position. Nonetheless, his last chance to rise to the top political circle — he is 67 years old — was likely marred by the defection in 1985 of his brother, Yu Qiangsheng; earlier this year, the arrest of an alleged spy led to a reshuffling of the Ministry of State Security, reminding many of Yu Qiangsheng’s defection. The reduction of the Standing Committee from nine to seven seats provided a politically neutral way to keep Yu Zhengsheng off the committee. Meanwhile, due to his age (Yu is the oldest candidate) and political influence, Yu may have been considered for a position more as a way to assist incoming leaders through his network and political resources.

Republishing by The Manila Times of this article is with express permission of STRATFOR.