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I would not say he will lead a coup, though he may
well do—if circumstances drive him to that action.
But his activities in the Senate,
if he does what he promised the voters, will trigger a coup against
the ruling power.
Several groups in—or are
related to—the Armed Forces of the Philippines can move and shake
things up to the point of triggering a coup d’etat. One of these
are the young officers, people like senator-elect Trillanes and his
cohort who did the Oakwood Mutiny. Other groups are such men as the
majors, colonels and generals who are now being tried—or waiting
to be charged—for allegedly fomenting a coup or acting to promote
destabilization. And there are also several groups of retired
military officers, whose words still count among the men they used
to command who can also incite or ignite the beginnings of a coup.
News that “a group of ‘top’
military officials, including two generals, have spoken to the
Inquirer—and revealed that they would supply Mr. Trillanes with
evidence and other “ammunition” against the Arroyo
administration when the cashiered Lt/SG conducts Senate probes in
the 14 th Congress —supports my idea. They will also present much
more information about heretofore unpublicized wrongdoings.
They have also told the Inquirer
of actually hearing AFP men boasting of having liquidated their
leftwing enemies. Such incidents drove one of them to call then AFP
chief Gen. Senga to ask if it is true that the killing of militants
by AFP men has become AFP and government policy. Senga replied
“No.”
The AFP-Arroyo situation has been
precarious since the months in 2005 when the Hello-Garci scandal
broke out, followed by the Hyatt 10 defections and in 2006 the
issuance of Proclamation 1017 (declaring a state of national
emergency) and the Marines stand off in Fort Bonifacio following the
relief of Marine commandant General Renato Mirando and the
subsequent arrest and detention of the AFP officers suspected of
being members or sympathizers of those who were about to mount a
coup.
In the Marines stand-off, there
was a report that the Pinoy semper fideles men in Sulu were confused
about who their commander was. The media gave news that Major
General Renato Miranda had been removed or had quit, but Col.
Juancho Sabban, commander of the 3rd Marine Brigade would not accept
anyone other than Gen. Miranda—at least not Deputy Marine
Commandant Brig. Gen. Nelson Allaga— until proper notice reached
him from HQ.
President Arroyo was, of course,
perturbed by all these goings on. At these moments no one really
knew where the various generals’ sympathies lay.
Vice-President Noli de Castro did
what he seldom did before and now never does. He gave unsolicited
advice. “The President should define and prescribe reasonable
terms to guide government agencies acting pursuant to her
declaration.”
There was also talk by Palace and
AFP spokesmen that the rebellious military had entered into an
alliance with the New People’s Army. Gen. Senga, was rumored to
have been in sympathy with those who are now facing charges and
detained.
I recount some of these troubling
incidents because Senator-elect Trillanes, who is still Lt.
Trillanes to his millions of admirers in the active military and the
civilian world, was elected primarily for being an anti-Arroy-administration
icon.
Eleven million-plus Filipinos did
not vote for him on May 14 because they heard him campaign about
improving the health care, the education or drainage system of this
country. The only thing they know about Mr. Trillanes is that he is
a prisoner of the AFP command, and is being tried in a general court
martial, because he was going to bring down the government by
leading the Oakwood Mutiny.
They could have seen an amazing
TV commercial showing the Genuine Opposition candidates. But the
message spoken by that commercial–Mr. Trillanes’ face being the
last to be seen by the viewer—was that voting for the GO
candidates was voting for the downfall of the Arroyo government.
How will Lt. Trillanes trigger a
coup? If his probes agitate junior officers and even senior ones to
move, the AFP command could be driven to do as the generals in
Thailand did last year, which is what the rightwing generals in
Indonesia did in 1965. They would be ready to anticipate the really
angry coup-movers and unite all the military factions, except the
leftwingers, around themselves. Then they would chuck the civilian
government.
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