The Manila Times

Opinion

  Home  

  About Us  

  Contact Us 

  Subscribe     Advertise  
  Archives     Feedback  

  Register  

  Help  

  Top Stories

  Metro

  Business

  Regions

  Opinion

  World

  Life & Times

  Sports

  Motoring

  Tech Times

 
 
 

Saturday, October 13, 2007

 

ABOVE ALL THINGS
By Ramon Jr. & Eloisa S. Mabutas

When a check bounces

 
Query: A neighbor bought a car costing P400,000. Upon the execution of the contract of sale, he was required by the car company to pay one-fourth of said amount. As he was allegedly short of cash, he asked me to issue a check for P50,000 to guarantee payment. I issued a check for said amount. Subsequently, I gathered that said neighbor had disappeared with the car—and nowhere to be found.

I, therefore, ordered my bank to stop the payment of the check. But the car company sued me for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. Said accusation intrigued me, for I had issued the check merely to guarantee the obligation of my neighbor to pay for said car. I asked myself why the company did not go after my neighbor. Besides, I had ordered the bank to stop the payment of the check for a valid reason. Can you please inform me if I am directly liable for the obligation incurred by my neighbor? Thank you.
Pete A.

Reply

Legally referred to as Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without sufficient funds for credit and for other purposes. It imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than a year or a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check, which should not exceed P200,000, or both at the discretion of the court.

The elements of the offense under BP 22 are:

(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason or cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. (Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 618; Meriz v. People, 368 SCRA 524; Villaber v. Commission on Elections, 369 SCRA 126).

The Supreme Court, however, in its decision in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No.131714, 16 November 1998; 298 SCRA 656), modified the sentence imposed for violation of BP 22 by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only the penalty of fine in an amount double the amount of the check. The High Tribunal said:

Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy.

Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not violated BP 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed… the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. In this case we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.

Again in the case of Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000), the Supreme Court en banc, applying the Vaca case, also deleted the penalty of imprisonment and sentenced the drawer of the bounced check to the maximum of the fine allowed by BP 22, i.e., P200,000, and concluded that “such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.”

Upon clarification sought by judges and other parties regarding the operation of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 issued on November 21, 2000, the Supreme Court issued SC Adm. Circular No. 13-2001 stating that it is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in BP 22. The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of BP 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

In your case, however, since the order to stop pay was for a valid reason or cause, you cannot be held liable for violation of BP 22.

____


Above all things, let us reflect on the statement of our Lord and Master Jesus Christ: “Human beings cannot live on bread alone, but need every word that God speaks.” (Matthew 4:4).

   
 

Phgifts

philflora.gif

Manila Times Friends


Sponsored Links
 

Back To Top

 
 
 


Powered by: 
The Manila Times Web Admin.

  

Home | About Us | Contact | Subscribe | Advertise | Feedback | Archives | Help

Copyright (c) 2001 The Manila Times | Terms of Service
The Manila Times Publishing Corp. All rights reserved.

Hosted by: