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By Juan T. Gatbonton, Editorial Consultant
The American founding fathers—who invented
presidential government—hedged their executive with checks and
balances, fearful of his intrusions on state autonomy. Ironically
the institution, transplanted to their Philippine colony, has turned
into an imperial presidency.
Operating in the context of our demoralized
bureaucracy and our fractionalized party system, the presidency has
been accumulating near-monarchic majesty. In its perpetual rivalry
with our legislature, it has been helped along by Congress’
reputation as a “talk shop” and “pork barrel” trough for
traditional politicians.
Sweeping powers to appoint
The “no re-election” rule—which prevents a
Philippine president from perpetuating himself in office—also
gives him free rein during his six years in power. Impeachment is
the electorate’s only legal check—but, as we’ve seen
repeatedly, the president could easily command a majority in the
House of Representatives. Negative opinion polls he can shrug off
even more casually.
Malacañang’s appointing powers beggar those
of the White House. The World Bank estimates its appointees
(including the officers of public corporations) to number 4,800. By
comparison, the American President appoints 800, and the British
Prime Minister only 200. The Philippine president can name
bureaucrats down to assistant-director level—which potentially
wipes out the civil-service leadership every time a new president
takes over. In the context of utang na loob, the presidency could
influence even the workings of the Supreme Court. Under the 1987
Constitution, presidential appointments to the High Court no longer
need Senate confirmation.
Control of the purse strings
But it is in the presidency’s control of the
state’s purse strings on which its dominance depends. The power to
“realign” the Budget—after the Marcos years limited to the
executive branch—still gives the chief executive great leeway in
amassing and deploying public moneys.
The balance of power between local governments
and the center has changed drastically over time. During the Spanish
period, Manila had been dependent on local governments to collect
the tribute and other revenues. Under the Americans, a more
efficient Center could impose national income taxes on both
corporations and individuals and collect customs duties. The bulk of
revenues is now collected by the center and doled out to local
governments.
In practice, the president can deprive any
sitting official—whether national or local—of the public funds
due his office. By manipulating budget releases, the president could
disarm political enemies while rewarding friends and allies.
The Budget secretary sits just a stone’s throw
from Malacañang Palace and is always one of the president’s
closest confidants. He gives to those whom the president wishes to
give, and withholds from those the president wishes to withhold.
Local officials and representatives are
particularly vulnerable to budget squeeze plays that deprive them of
their Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) and “pork-barrel”
funds. Senators are better able to withstand presidential pressure,
since their constituencies are national and diffuse.
Striking down oversight powers
The current controversy between the presidency
and the legislature concerns a Supreme Court decision that upholds a
Cabinet secretary’s right to refuse to answer questions by three
Senate oversight committees looking into the quality of President
Gloria Arroyo’s intervention in a high-value contract with a
Chinese multinational corporation.
Refusing to accept then-NEDA Secretary Romulo
Neri’s invocation of “executive privilege,” the Senate had
ordered him arrested for contempt. Stepping into the breach, the
Supreme Court, by a 9-6 vote, upheld Neri’s plea—setting off
criticism from among those who believe the High Court has
irreparably upset the Legislative-Executive balance of power.
Like many other citizens, I fear that the High
Court ruling reinforces executive power at the very time it needs to
be curtailed—before it overwhelms the two other co-equal branches
of government.
Restoring the power balance
There is no easy way of restoring the balance of
power among our three branches of government. Intractable problems
will need to be dealt with through Charter change.
The amendments in the 1987 Constitution, written
in reaction to the national experience of strong-man rule (they
include the presidential no-reelection clause) have generally worked
poorly.
—We need to begin profes-sionalizing the civil
service, by limiting severely the presidency’s appointing powers,
and setting up the beginnings of a career executive service.
—We should restore the Senate’s confirmation
power over High Court justices. The present-day arrangement lacks
openness. It is also weighted to favor the executive.
—We should curtail the President’s broad
powers to “re-align” the Budget. And we should ensure—perhaps
through legislation—that elective officials get their IRAs and CDF
funds routinely. All backbone public-works expenditures Congress
should write in a priority program approved at the beginning of
every year.
—After thorough-going reform of our electoral
system, we should consider resetting presidential term limits to two
or even three terms of four years each.
Notes and Comment appears fortnightly on
Mondays. It will not be in tomorrow’s issue.
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