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By Daniel C. Lynch
Intersection of the Beijing Olympics with the
Chinese public’s well-organized response to the Sichuan earthquake
has sparked extensive speculation that China may be on the cusp of a
major political change. Some believe it could even be a step or two
closer now to democratization. Sadly, such speculation does not
consider certain crucial facts in the current trajectory of Chinese
political development, which is by no means democratic.
The logic of the positive story goes something
like this: Because of the Internet, integration into global affairs
(exemplified by the Olympics), and three decades of rapid economic
growth, Chinese society has changed fundamentally. People are now
willing and able to organize for the purpose of helping their fellow
citizens in distress—even strangers in other provinces—and to
unite in the pursuit of large-scale public projects designed to
bring glory to their nation.
This can only mean that a genuine civil society
has taken shape, which in any case always occurs when a country’s
per capita income reaches a certain (high-ish) level. And once a
civil society is in place, democratization is eventually inevitable.
Civil society development has indeed been crucial to democratization
in other countries, but the problem with applying such logic to
China is three-fold:
First, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
still refuses to recognize the legitimacy of civic groups’
ultimate autonomy—and this in spite of the fact it promised
political liberalization in exchange for the right to host the
Olympics. The Party took quick command of earthquake relief efforts
after the first chaotic 48 hours and eventually began arresting
critics who complained about the quality of school construction. For
civil society to become consolidated and lay the groundwork for
democratization, it must first be recognized as legitimate by the
authoritarian power-holders. Some in the CCP might be willing to
move in this direction, but the key elites all assert that
civil-society groups’ proper political role is to assist the local
governments as underlings and consultants.
Second, in cases of successful democratization,
activist civil society groups are almost always supported by
pro-democratic new middle classes. In China, there certainly is a
new middle (and upper) class; one good indicator is the 220 million
people who now access the Internet regularly. But 220 million is
still only one-sixth of the country’s huge population. Many of
these people feel mortified at the prospect of democratization
because it would imply turning over the reins of ultimate power to
the five-sixths of the population who are relatively poor and
uneducated. How can such people be trusted to elect wise and
responsible leaders?
China’s prosperous urbanites feel altruism
toward their disadvantaged compatriots, but they don’t think the
poor should be empowered. They should be assisted in various ways,
and subjected to fairer treatment. They should be treated to grand
spectacles like the Olympics so they can forget their troubles for
awhile and take pride in their country. But they should not be given
voting and other civic rights because they would surely use them to
elect demagogues and know-nothings who would destroy middle-class
prosperity.
Third, the CCP has succeeded in cultivating in
the minds of many of those benefiting from the current order the
notion that democratization is a plot hatched by the West and Japan
to bring disorder and chaos to China for the purpose of halting its
peaceful rise. China’s new middle classes are fiercely patriotic.
They relish the thought of putting “little Japan” in its place;
of unifying Taiwan; and of catching up with the U.S. in
“comprehensive national power.” When the CCP points to Russia
and contends that democratization would lead to chaos, or to India
and the Philippines and argues that it would slow economic growth,
many in the new middle classes are persuaded. How could the dream of
restoring China to world greatness or even global centrality succeed
if the country were to accept the West’s advice and follow in the
footsteps of Russia, India and the Philippines?
China is, in short, a very different country
from such successful Asian democracies as Taiwan, South Korea and
Thailand. In these places, the former authoritarian state’s
control was never so complete that it could prevent the emergence of
genuinely autonomous civic groups. Moderates among the authoritarian
elites became willing to work with moderates in civil society
jointly to pursue controlled but significant political change.
At the same time, Taiwan’s, South Korea’s,
and Thailand’s new middle classes did not, for the most part, fear
the political participation of the poor and uneducated. Many saw
liberal political change as the ultimate solution to poverty and
backwardness. Finally, almost no one in these newer democracies
worried that liberalization was a Western plot designed to prevent
their country’s glorious rise in world affairs.
In short, China is embarked upon a substantially
different developmental trajectory from that of its democratic
neighbors. CCP elites expect to remain in power indefinitely into
the future, perfecting their authoritarian system by suppressing
corruption, increasing efficiency, and enhancing responsiveness to
people’s needs. The eventual result will not necessarily be an
authoritarian megapower threatening its neighbors or the US-although
such an outcome can’t be ruled out.
The key point is simply that if current trends
hold, China’s future will not be democratic. Neither all of the
hullabaloo surrounding the Olympics nor the Sichuan earthquake
response significantly alters China’s developmental trajectory.
The sooner the world recognizes this fact, the sooner we can all
begin preparing for the real Chinese future.
Mr. Lynch, associate professor of International
Relations at the University of Southern California, is the author of
“ Rising China and Asian Democratization,” out in paperback by
Stanford University Press this month.
-- Far Eastern Economic Review
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