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EMPLOYERS could not simply dismiss a probationary employee during
the probationary period without complying with the requirements of
due process, according to the Supreme Court.
In a 20-page decision, the High Court’s First
Division upheld an earlier ruling by a labor arbiter and the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) declaring as illegal the
dismissal of Dante dela Cruz, who was hired for an international
ship by Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. and Elite Shipping A.S.
The decision, penned by Associate Justice Renato
Corona, also reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals which favored the dismissal of dela Cruz, on grounds that
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the labor
arbiter’s decision.
“The contrary findings and conclusions made by
the LA [labor arbiter] and the NLRC were supported by jurisprudence
and the evidence on record,” the High Court said.
Records show that dela Cruz was hired for the
vessel M/S Arktis Morning through its local agency, Maersk Filipinas,
on April 19, 1999.
In a logbook entry dated June 18, 1999, the
ship’s chief engineer, Normann Per Nielsen, expressed
dissatisfaction over Dela Cruz’s performance, with the threat of
dismissal in accordance with the company’s collective bargaining
agreement (CBA).
The CBA stipulates that the first 60 days of
service is to be considered probationary, which entitles the
shipowner or representative, to terminate an employment contract by
giving a 14-day written notice.
The High Court, however, said the dismissal was
illegal because the employer failed to prove that it was for just
cause.
“Furthermore, not only must the dismissal be
for a cause provided by law, it should also comply with the
rudimentary requirements of due process, that is, the opportunity to
be heard and to defend oneself.”
The High Court added: “These requirements are
of equal application to cases of Filipino seamen recruited to work
on board foreign vessels.”
Contrary to the respondents’ claim, the High
Court pointed out, “the logbook entries did not substantially
comply with the first notice, or the written notice of charge,”
stressing that the entries raised more questions than answers as
“the entries did not contain any information at all as to why he
was even being warned of discharge in the first place.”
With the High Court’s ruling, the petitioner
can claim a salary covering three months and payment for
attorney’s fees.
-- William B. Depasupil
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