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By Juan T. Gatbonton, Editorial Consultant
Popular expectations raised by economic growth are giving rise to a
“new politics” in Southeast Asia. And a main characteristic of
this new politics lies in the increasing differentiation in voting
behavior between the rural electorate and the big-city middleclass
in our electoral democracies.
This distinction roils politics in Malaysia and
in our own country; but right now it is sharpest in Thailand. There
the “one-man, one-vote” rule has virtually disenfranchised the
dominant minority in the kingdom’s hierarchical society.
Dismantling
Thaksin’s Thailand
The center of the storm in Bangkok is Thaksin
Shinawatra, the only Thai prime minister ever reelected. Though
deposed by a bloodless military coup in September 2006 shortly after
winning a second term, he remains widely popular among rural voters,
particularly in the bone-poor northeast region.
As in our own country, the benefits from
economic expansion and openness have been confined to Bangkok and
its environs—with very little trickling down upcountry.
On these long-neglected Thais, Thaksin during
his five years in office lavished low-cost healthcare,
debt-forgiveness, infrastructure development, and
“one-town-one-product” investments. For good measure, he also
rid their villages of narcotic drugs in a harsh police campaign that
killed hundreds of dealers.
Much like Ramon Magsaysay in our country,
Thaksin succeeded in giving the Thai poor the feeling that they
count in the concerns of the Thai state.
As soon as the generals restored electoral
processes in December 2007, Thaksin’s party regained control of
parliament—though he himself didn’t contest. In the most recent
reshuffle of the top political leadership, Thaksin’s
brother-in-law has been nominated prime minister. The nomination is
unlikely to prosper, because of a rebellion in the ruling coalition
itself. Thaksin, with his family, is himself in England, seeking
political asylum.
Not ready for democracy
By seeking to enlarge parliament’s powers at
the expense of the judiciary, the bureaucracy and even of the
monarchy, Thaksin threatened the traditional prerogatives of the
Thai Establishment. Bangkok’s anti-Thaksin protesters—an
assortment of royalists, bureaucrats, business-people,
professionals, students and some liberal politicians—say frankly
that after 18 coups and 18 Constitutions since the proclamation of a
constitutional monarchy in 1932, Thailand is not ready for electoral
democracy.
They propose appointing the majority of
parliament (presumably by the monarchy); and giving high
bureaucrats, big businessmen and the general staff some
participation in the making of political policy.
Malaysian melee
In Malaysia, the Malay maverick Anwar Ibrahim
leads a multiracial coalition challenging the entrenched UMNO
(United Malay National Organization) and its conservative ethnic
Chinese and Indian coalition partners—and seems to be on the verge
of winning power.
Once heir-apparent to the Malay strongman, Dr.
Mahathir Mohamad, Anwar was brought down after he challenged
Mahathir for the prime-ministership.
Detained under a British-period internal
security act that allows government to detain its opponents without
trial, he was accused of sodomy and abuse of power and imprisoned
for six years, before being released in 2004.
Returning to parliament from prison and
disgrace, Anwar has forged a coalition whose goal is nothing less
than to dismantle all of Malaysia’s political restraints—and
enable Malaysian democracy to keep pace with the buoyant Malaysian
economy.
Second thoughts
about ‘People Power’
In our own country, people’s anxieties arise
from frustration with our procedural democracy’s inability to
produce good leaders, cut down corruption in office, and restore
idealism among our public officials.
Twice in the last 20 years, citizens have had to
intervene directly in the representative process—taking on
themselves the task of replacing first an oppressive president and
then a corrupt one—risking constitutional crisis and even civil
conflict.
Since the president is accountable directly to
the electorate, he is in practice really answerable to no one the
moment he is elected—particularly since the “no-reelection”
clause was written into the 1987 Charter.
And, as we saw in 2000 to 2001, a president can
even defy public opinion with impunity—because the fixed
presidential term also makes his impeachment tremendously
difficult—short of an upheaval during which constitutional
mandates are “creatively” interpreted—if not actually set
aside.
‘No’ to direct action
The revolutionary formula of peaceful “People
Power” we Filipinos have exported to Eastern Europe and the rest
of the world. But we ourselves have begun to doubt its
effectiveness—because direct action by citizens in representative
democracies really works only when it is backed up by the military.
So, the danger of the military component overcoming the civilian
component is always there.
This was why political agitations against
President Gloria Arroyo died down well short of those of 1986 and
2001—although close to half her Cabinet quit and the sainted widow
of the martial-law martyr, Ninoy Aquino, called for her resignation.
After having led two “People Power”
revolutions, our city middle- class refused to take to the streets
for the third time in middle 2005—unwilling to entrust the nation
once again to specific politicians and military officers in place of
popular institutions, no matter how flawed.
Editor’s note: Notes & Comments appears
fortnightly.
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