The Vatican, the United States, and human rights advocates sounded international alarm bells, which Suharto and his spokesmen blithely ignored. “Foreigners are entitled to think what they want,” was one official’s stony response. Amnesty International was derided as a “fuss maker”. Efforts to combat crime should be appreciated, one minister glibly remarked. A speaker of parliament saw no problem in “sacrificing hundreds of bandits to give a feeling of tranquility” to the rest of the Indonesian population. One reflective official likened the killings to a “surgical operation to save the life of the patient”. In sum, while no authoritative admission from the government was forthcoming, tacit approvals, justifications, and apologia abounded. General Ali Murtopo, more confident than most, had no patience for coyness. As former information minister, major political power broker, and close Suharto confidant, he could say that the killings would stop “when those who have the authority decide that the mission is over”—which is exactly what happened. By 1985, Petrus activity had fizzled out.