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By Amante E. Bigornia
(First of three parts)
The current move to amend the 1987 Constitution,
the third in as many presidencies, appears to have come at a more
propitious time than the first two attempts. Like its predecessors,
it may fizzle out, not necessarily for the same reasons. These days,
the manner one promotes Charter change (Cha-cha) is perhaps
scrutinized more closely than what actually needs change.
As early as the start of the 1990s, when the
Charter was barely two years old, its flaws were already obvious.
The consensus was that the Constitution was hurriedly drafted, by a
hastily formed commission composed mostly by persons with
insufficient experience in government.
There was a pressing need in 1987 for a new
Constitution, du-ring the aftermath of an unprecedented popular
uprising, the 1986 EDSA revolt. Defective provisions were
inevitable, and were consequently overlooked, and the draft ratified
by a people euphoric in regaining democracy after a decade of
martial law.
The Marcos legacy
The prevailing desire at the time to root out
all vestiges of the hated Marcos regime did not help any. In their
hurry, the framers of the new Charter incorporated flawed remedies
for martial law anomalies. They slashed the allowable terms of
office of elective officials, including the president, in a bid to
prevent the reemergence of political dynasties, private armies and
the accumulation of illegal wealth by those in power.
The first batch of elective officials in the
post-Marcos era saw the end of their three-year terms approaching
with little to show for their efforts. They had yet to develop new
constituencies and saw the strong possibility of losing bids for
other elective posts. They felt the need to scrap the term limits
from the Charter.
Thus the first move to amend the new
Constitution emanated from those holding offices below the
presidency.
By then, president Corazon C. Aquino had
realized she was not up to the job, as she had feared when the legal
opposition had urged her to run against President Marcos in the 1986
snap polls. Mrs. Aquino objected to what she called “tinkering”
with the Charter. And, with her astonishing popularity still intact,
she had her way.
Doubts, fears
The need for removing the term limits of
elective officials was indeed valid. But when the clamor for Charter
change, later to be popularly called Cha-cha, reemerged shortly
after the 1992 general elections, it was not the removal of the term
limitations on senators down to the municipal councilmen that the
people objected to. It concerned the presidency which, because of
its abuse by Marcos, was regarded the embodiment of all that was
evil and hateful in government.
Perhaps the newly-elected president, Fidel V.
Ramos, had yet to harbor designs to extend his own term. But the
wounds inflicted by the Marcos dictatorship on the people were still
so raw and painful that when the new chief executive’s supporters
started talking of Cha-cha, the immediate reaction of most of the
citizenry was to object. Ramos told supporters to back off,
following massive protest demonstrations nationwide.
The same fate awaited the attempt of the next
president, Joseph “Erap” Estrada. In spite of Erap’s
phenomenal popularity with the masses that gave him the largest ever
margin of victory in presidential elections, he was forced by
threats of mass actions to withdraw his advocacy of amendments even
before he could identify them.
Today, President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be
accused of wanting to amend the Charter to perpetuate herself in
power. She has not only come out openly against Cha-cha; she can
legally run for a full six-year term, having assumed the presidency
by virtue of being the vice president when Estrada was deposed last
year. After nine years as chief executive, granting she runs for and
wins a term on her own, she would be too worn out to govern the
nation.
Timid advocates
But even with the absence of this constitutional
obstacle and the possibility that the President might spike the
persistent suspicion that she is seeking a full term, Cha-cha
proponents have yet to vigorously push their agenda.
They have not yet come out with specific
amendments to identified flaws in the Charter. Instead, they have
resorted to holding informal consultations with their constituents,
giving the impression that they have not yet made up their minds on
what provisions in the Constitution should be changed.
About the only provisos that Cha-cha proponents
harp on are the present forms of government. They would have a
parliamentary system replace the presidential system currently in
place and the unitary form of government replaced by a federation of
states.
But even with these changes, they are reluctant
to go into specifics. There are many types of parliaments just as
there are various kinds of federations and Cha-cha advocates
probably have not made up their minds on what type to recommend to
their people. Or they could be unsure of the reception their choices
might get from the voters and would rather wait for public opinion
regarding them to develop, to avoid risking popular dissent at this
time.
Such pusillanimity is not difficult to
understand. The quality of the present political leadership in the
country has been reduced considerably as a result of faulty
electoral innovations introduced through the Charter. At the same
time, over its head hover the amendments to earlier constitutions
that had dubious, self-serving motivations, which could also be
imputed to anyone proposing Cha-cha today.
Never again
The past two Philippine Constitutions that were
amended (that adopted by the first Republic during the revolution
against Spain at the end of the 19th century was too short-lived to
require amendments), had changes that if made today would provoke
nationwide, perhaps even violent, opposition from the people.
The 1935 Constitution, written for the
Philippine Commonwealth under American rule and later adopted by the
Republic after the country gained its independence from the United
States in 1946, was amended three times. The amendments included the
change from a unicameral to a bicameral legislature to accommodate
the ambitions and agenda of Manuel L. Quezon (he became Senate
president). It also reduced the single six-year term of the
president to four years with a reelection added, in effect allowing
an eight-year tenure for Quezon. However, his death in the US during
the Japanese occupation robbed him of a second term.
A more onerous amendment to the 1935 Charter
could have provoked even more massive protest demonstrations if made
today. This was the so-called Parity Amendment which gave American
citizens equal rights with Filipinos in the exploitation of the
country’s natural resources and in the operation of public
utilities. The protests against Balikatan 02-1 would certainly pale
beside the mass actions that activists and nationalists would mount
if that supremely unfair amendment were to be made in the 1987
Charter.
Pale shadows
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution,
adopted shortly after the declaration of martial law by President
Marcos in Sept. 21, 1972, was also amended on four occasions. Among
the significant amendments were: the change to a parliamentary form
of government, with the incumbent president, Marcos, assuming the
powers of the prime minister and exercising his concurrent
law-making powers even after the alleged lifting of martial law in
1981. If Marcos were alive today and such an amendment were to be
proposed, there would be hell to pay.
Presidents Quezon and Marcos were able to get
away with such atrocious abuse of power because they possessed the
leadership qualities that effectively stifled dissent. They were
bold, confident of their capabilities.
Today, as a result of the politically
debilitating effects of more than a decade of martial law and
certain flaws of the present Constitution, there are no leaders in
the mould of Quezon and Marcos. The present leaders just don’t
have the audacity and brilliance to compel other leaders to follow
them. In short, the political leadership as a whole is very weak,
even irresolute at times.
Party system
Ironically, advocates of Cha-cha skirt
discussions on the principal cause of the prevailing weakened
political leadership. This is the perversion and almost total
destruction of the political party system. Not too many people are
aware of the insidious and deleterious effects of this post-martial
law political development, including its impact on the national
economy.
There might be Cha-cha proponents among the
comparatively few who recognize this problem. But they cannot be
expected to advocate reversing this harmful development, which in a
way made it possible for them to be where they are today. With real
political parties, they may not have risen to the positions they now
hold.
A return to the party system, which the
Americans claim is the basis of their political system, will be
anathema to elective officials. This will specially threaten
those who have yet to establish constituencies they can fully
control, having won their posts mainly by virtue of their
popularity, not their qualifications for the office. Under the party
system, it is not easy to become a leader.
Thus, while the revival of the party system,
particularly the practice of having only two major parties vying for
power, may be the most urgent and critical Charter amendment that
could be proposed at this time, it may never be given a chance to be
considered by the electorate.
Its mere inclusion in the proposed amendments
may even result in the total rejection of Cha-cha. Obviously afraid
of this prospect, the elective officials advocating change have been
meticulously avoiding discussion of the issue, preferring to focus
on amendments less prone to triggering heated, even violent debate.
To be sure, there are amendments that, if not as
urgent and crucial as that concerning the party system, need to be
adopted. But they would not suffice to make it the supreme law to
guide the nation to a brighter future.
(To be continued)
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