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By Johnna Villaviray and Inday Espina-Varona
Second of three parts
As a young man of 25, Al-Hadj Murad fought
abreast 300 other Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) guerrillas
protecting the rugged terrain of Camp Darapanan in Sultan Kudarat,
Maguindanao from “marauding” military forces.
It took the military a year of sustained attacks
to take a considerable portion of the camp. But even this was not
enough to break the Muslims’ determination to give their people
control over Mindanao.
Three decades later, Murad is still fighting,
this time as Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s (MILF) peace panel
chief. The battle, at least temporarily, has shifted to the
negotiating table.
“We’ve learned a lot over the years, new
tactics, we’ve adjusted to the situation,” Murad acknowledges in
a telephone interview with The Manila Times. The MILF’s deputy
chairman for military affairs stays in Kuala Lumpur these days, and
enjoys the respect of key government personalities involved in the
peace process. Yet while Murad and other rebel leaders talk peace,
they have not let down their guard.
The country’s largest separatist group
continues to train its estimated 35,000 guerrillas, two-thirds of
whom are armed. The Armed Forces places the MILF’s armed strength
at half that number.
Murad, MILF chairman Hashim Salamat, central
committee chairman Aleem Mimbantas are aging lions. Grandfathers who
look their age. And, as Murad and company hope to secure peace as a
lasting legacy for the Bangsamoro People, they are being challenged
by a new generation of restless, radicalized youth.
Mutual distrust
War has always been a way of life for the
Filipino-Muslims. The struggle for self-rule has outlived the
colonization of the Spaniards and the Americans. It was sustained
even after a Filipino took over the helm of government.
President Macapagal-Arroyo adopted an “all-out
peace” policy in Mindanao shortly after she assumed the
presidency. The talks were carried out despite mutual distrust, a
legacy of deposed president Joseph Estrada’s “all-out war”
against the largest Muslim separatist group.
Military officials, and even civilian security
analysts, suspect the MILF of using the peace talks to regain
strength. The Estrada campaign, from March to July 2000, led to the
capture of all the MILF’s 48 camps, including its headquarters,
Camp Abubakar. The AFP campaign report, by the 4th Infantry
Division, claims 1,089 rebels were killed and 1,722 wounded — but
it is almost impossible to independently verify casualty figures in
Mindanao.
The MILF responds to the attack by accusing
hawks in the government of sabotaging peace negotiations, because
their idea of peace is genocide.
“(Defense Secretary Angelo) Reyes is one big
stumbling block to the peace process,’’ says MILF spokesman Eid
Kabalu.
Reyes, then Armed Forces Chief of Staff,
engineered the Estrada administration’s “all-out war” policy
against the rebel group.
Kabalu does not doubt Mrs. Macapagal-Arroyo’s
sincerity. But he wryly notes that her “political debt” to Reyes
and the Armed Forces — for withdrawing support for Estrada at the
height of EDSA People Power II – is slowing down the peace
process.
Formal peace talks were suspended last year
after government chief negotiator Jesus Dureza balked at allowing
the MILF a say on rehabilitation efforts in war-torn communities.
These communities are actually the same 48 “camps” established
by the MILF since seceding from the MNLF in 1979. At least one camp,
Abubakar, covers 100 sq. km., and sprawls across four towns in
Maguindanao and two others in Lanao del Sur.
“(Dureza) wants to (unilaterally) amend the
provisions of the Tripoli agreement, which says that the MILF would
be allowed to (help in the rehabilitation efforts). He’s on the
side of Reyes,’’ Kabalu charges.
More sympathetic are Presidential Advisers
Eduardo Ermita (Peace Process) and Norberto Gonzales (Special
Concerns). Both Ermita and Gonzales had extensive experience in
cobbling the 1996 peace settlement with the MNLF.
Potential schism
Murad underscores the need for the government
side to get over its biases and concentrate on the rehabilitation of
Mindanao.
This, he warns, is the only way to arrest a
split within the MILF, similar to that which befell the MNLF, but
even more dangerous in the light of global terrorist networks.
Gonzales echoes this claim, as do AFP officers, who have watched
warily since the 1980s as Islamic radicalism advanced in Southeast
Asia.
Gonzales, in an interview with The Times, frets
that the sluggish pace of the peace process has triggered discontent
among ground commanders identified with peace negotiator Mimbantas,
who recently retreated to the confines of Camp Bushra in Lanao del
Norte.
Mimbantas himself is known as a moderate MILF
leader and has been known to have disagreements with the more fiery
political deputy, Ghadzali Jaafar, Kabalu, and Western Mindanao
chairman Sharif Jullabi.
Gonzales refuses to attach a name to the group,
which he described as “very young, Afghan-trained” guerrillas.
“They haven’t found a leader yet, but this
group doesn’t listen to the MILF hierarchy. It’s a teeny-tiny
group, but they’re growing. And they have the funds because
they’re the ones involved in extra-curricular activities”
Gonzales notes.
The government, he adds, has been working hard
to arrest the growth of the rogue group, which has the potential of
unleashing another bloodbath in the already war-shattered landscape
of Mindanao.
Military officials say the group is so new —
and nebulous — that it doesn’t yet have a name. In military
documents, it is only referred to as the “Southern Philippines
Secession Group,” composed of disillusioned MNLF, MILF and Abu
Sayyaf fighters.
A senior military official, who requests
anonymity, also notes that the Pentagon — more recognized as an
out and out criminal group — is also really part of the MILF’s
tentacles.
But Gonzales quickly shields the MILF leadership
— Mimbantas included — from any responsibility in the birth of
an extremist faction within the MILF.
“The burden is as much on us,” he remarks.
Murad agrees that part of the unrest within the
MILF ranks is the prospect of the peace talks dragging on
indefinitely without any tangible results.
“That’s why we need to implement the
rehabilitation programs as soon as possible,” he urges.
Fait acompli
At present, peace talks are being undertaken on
an informal level. Murad assures that the level or the personalities
involved in the negotiations is not a major consideration for the
MILF.
“As long as we’re getting somewhere,” he
points out.
The peace process is trudging along. Last month,
Gonzales signed an interim peace agreement with Murad, basically a
reiteration of earlier agreements adopted between the two parties.
This latest agreement drew the indignation of
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate, however.
They questioned Gonzales’ authority in engaging the MILF in back
channel talks, even after Malacañang said he was authorized by the
President.
“It’s a witch hunt against Gonzales. The
politicians don’t want him around,” a security analyst for
government says. “He is a very effective negotiator. The
politicians don’t like him because he doesn’t broadcast his
moves, and so they can’t use him for their politicking.”
A senior military official acknowledges that
Gonzales was being persecuted, not because of the concessions he
gave the MILF, but because he did not consult with the other
personalities involved in the peace process — i.e. Reyes and
Dureza.
“Actually, they wouldn’t have approved of it
had they known beforehand. I suppose (Gonzales) felt it was the
lesser evil to face an inquiry after the fact than have the
initiative shot down even before it got anywhere,” the official
says.
It is expected for the military to object that
any concessions be given to the MILF, however. Some 273 soldiers
were killed in the five-month campaign that almost brought the
biggest insurgency movement in the country to its knees.
“But it was really a battle for real estate,
they did not get the fighters, just the camps,” Gonzales remarks.
“The Estrada campaign only managed to neutralize five percent of
the overall force of the MILF.”
Cynical mood
The Estrada administration believed that
negotiating from a standpoint of strength would hasten the peace
process with the MILF.
On the contrary it made the peace negotiations
more difficult, Gonzales opines.
He explained that Estrada’s war policy only
heightened Christian hostility against the Muslims, and vice versa.
“So anyone who talks about peace with the
Muslims now is likely to be very unpopular now,” Gonzales notes.
“Also, people seemed to have stopped caring because of too many
promises in the past. They’ve become cynical.”
The military officer says Gonzales did the right
thing with the May Jakarta agreement.
“You will have to give back their communities,
their homes. And, of course, you have to help them rebuild,” he
points. “The truth is, we bombed their homes and set fire to
these. If we’re going to start anew, let’s do it right.”
The officer also notes that Malacañang and the
AFP have stressed guerrillas would not be allowed to set up base
again — although Kabalu and Murad claim their men have never left
the camps. Gonzales says any final peace agreement would have to
include the laying down of arms — and oversight which has cost the
government dearly in the case of Nur Misuari’s MNLF, which still
owns a formidable array of weapons, including some sophisticated
crew-operated systems.
The Camp Abubakar report, written by officers
involved in the campaign, admits that the MILF’s greatest strength
remains its promise of the Islamic way of life.
Peace, Gonzales says, should accommodate this
legitimate aspiration. The Macapagal-Arroyo peace offer, he adds,
offers Filipino Muslims their Islamic communities — without the
armed force.
To be continued
First of three parts
| Conclusion
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