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By Dave L. Llorito, Research Head
Conclusion
(The communist insurgency is the single biggest
reason why Quezon province remains a backwater in terms of economic
growth and development. Potential businesses and development
investors are wary of putting money in Quezon despite its vast
potential because of the rebels’ strong presence there and the
“revolutionary” taxes they exact. The conclusion of this special
report explains how feudal vestiges strengthen the communist
movement in Quezon.)
Ending Quezon’s economic isolation is
definitely one big step the government has taken to spur growth in
the province. Just a decade ago, traveling to Bondoc Peninsula from
Lucena to Mulanay was seven-hour ordeal over about 150 kilometers of
rough roads. These days, travel time is about four hours over
much-improved concrete highway up to Pitogo, thanks to the
P1.64-billion Bondoc Peninsula Roads (BPR) project that was launched
when Fidel V. Ramos was president.
BPR is part of the sixth road package being
financed by the Asian Development Bank. The project covers 148.5 kms.
of paved arterial road from Malicboy in Pagbilao to Mulanay in
Bondoc. Also part of the project is the concreting of a 20-km.
highway from Mulanay to San Narciso. The 40-km. stretch between
Pitogo and Mulanay, if one passes through Macalelon, General
Luna and Catanauan, is still bad but residents are hoping that it,
too, would soon be paved.
Jose Enriquez, executive director of the Bondoc
Peninsula Development Project (BDP), says that the road to Mulanay
would be completed in a year or two. “By that time, travel to
Bondoc would be much easier. Travel time from Lucena will probably
be down to just three hours.”
Enriquez says that about six jeeploads of saba
bananas, equivalent to about 20 tons, leave Catanauan each day for
markets in Lucena and Metro Manila. Recently, he says, one
agribusiness firm has offered to buy Bondoc’s saba to be used as
raw material in making ketchup. He says that the offered price
is low — only P4 per kilo, but with a much-improved road network,
farmers could have lower transport cost, making the proposed
business deal potentially viable.
“Now we are studying how we could respond to
be able to produce the required volume,” Enriquez adds.
Prudencio Maxino Jr., mayor of Mulanay, says
that with the completion of the BPR roads, much of Bondoc could
forge stronger economic linkages with the rest of the province.
“These new roads would generate a lot of
economic opportunities for the Mulanay as well as the rest of Bondoc
Peninsula,” Maxino says. “My only complaint is that construction
of these roads seems to be very, very slow.”
Revitalizing the coconut industry and
agricultural diversification appears to be another surefire formula.
Being highly dependent on the coconut industry, Quezon took a big
blow when copra prices plunged due to keener competition from other
vegetable oil substitutes in the world market.
From the late ’70s until the
’80s, the Marcos government collected the coconut levy meant to
generate funds to finance programs to improving the lives of coconut
farmers. The coconut levy ended up being controlled by
Marcos’ cronies. This issue agitated Quezon’s peasantry, fueling
the rapid rise of communist insurgency in the area.
For Enriquez, however, the more basic concern is
to address a deeper problem: Bondoc’s “feudal structure”
characterized by an inequitable land ownership pattern and the
inability of poor peasants to access productive resources. He
says that despite some gains in agrarian reform, much of the huge
land holdings are still owned by a few families. It is widely
believed that this “feudal structure” is one major source of
discontent among the peasantry, making them vulnerable to communist
agitation.
“There exists a persistent feudal exploitation
brought about by an extreme insufficiency of information on basic
rights of tenants and an absence of viable mechanisms for resolving
agrarian reform-related conflict,” says BDP in a report.
In 1990, there were 55,227 households in the
area. Only 1.1 percent of them control 44,333 out of the
100,000 hectares that are due for land distribution under the
government’s agrarian reform program. In a report, BDP says the
biggest landholdings in Bondoc Peninsula are the following:
1. Doming Reyes with family holdings estimated
at 12,000 to 16,000 hectares in three municipalities. BDP
notes that prior to 1996, not a single hectare was included in the
agrarian reform program because of the landowner’s “fearsome
reputation.” Out of fear, not one tenant wanted to apply for
agrarian reform coverage. Tightly guarded, the lands are hard to
penetrate. After five years of trying, BDP was able to facilitate
the distribution of the certificate of land ownership agreements (CLOA)
covering 174 ha. A total of 451 ha. are also due for
distribution. These figures hardly made a dent on the
landowner’s monopoly over large tract of lands.
2. Uy family with total landholdings of 3,500
ha. Despite the vigorous organizing work in partnership with
non-government organizations (NGOs) and militant groups, not a
single hectare has been distributed. BDP, however, claims that
1,138 ha. are “nearly consummated” or almost a done deal for
farmers. Some farmers have also stopped paying their shares to the
landowners.
3. Matias estate, covering 2,800 ha. Not a
single hectare has also been distributed. Despite the existence of
an agrarian reform program for more than a decade, tenants are still
in the process of petitioning for agrarian reform coverage for areas
involving 105 ha.
4. Tan family/clan, covering 3,000 ha. As of
this date, not a single hectare has been distributed. A total of 400
ha. have been “engaged” (BDP’s term for being petitioned for
CARP coverage) by BDP and other peasant organizations, but most of
these lands are “problematic.”
5. Superior Agro-Industrial estate, covering 540
ha. Not a hectare was distributed. Farmers were continuously
harassed and some were evicted. The landowner was even able to
secure exclusion from the Department of Agrarian Reform. About
13 farmers are pushing for leasehold implementation, a deliberate
strategy to force the owner to submit his properties for land
distribution, but there are no positive results as of this writing.
6. Timberland areas covering 58,000 ha. have
also been targeted by BDP and peasant groups for reclassification
and redistribution. The process has not gone beyond
reclassification.
Enriquez explains that these are just among the
glaring problems of land concentration.
Since 1996, BDP and its partners had achieved
“land tenure improvement” in over 9,125 lands. However, he also
clarifies that only 1,918 lands involved the distribution of CLOA,
while 472 cases involved the transformation of peasants’ tenure
from tenant to leaseholders. He blames stiff resistance from
landlords for the slow implementation of land reform.
The rest are “PO-controlled lands”
(people’s organizations) covering 6,018 ha of public lands and 717
ha. of private ones.
“Without a meaningful land redistribution, the
gains of good infrastructure would largely accrue to a few who are
already well off,” says one BDP technical staff.
First Part
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