|
By Johnna Villaviray
(First of 3 parts)
Dec. 30, 2000: Scores of commuters rushing to
beat the New Year’s Eve traffic perished while more than a hundred
were injured as a powerful bomb ripped through an LRT train’s
front coach in Manila’s Tayuman district.
May 27, 2001: 20 tourists — including three
Americans — and workers were seized from the Dos Palmas resort in
Palawan. That started a kidnapping spree, which ensnared 102 people
in a year-long hostage crisis, climaxing last June in a bloody
commando rescue for the final three hostages. The operation killed
an American and a Filipino nurse and freed an American missionary.
These two attacks were as significant to
Filipinos as the Sept. 11 US suicide crashes that killed over a
thousand and reduced the World Trade Center (WTC) and a portion of
the Pentagon to rubble.
All three attacks were blamed on Muslim
extremist groups and were dramatic enough to drive home this point:
Terrorists are among us.
Afghan vets
The first extremists in the Philippines were
recruited from the 1,000 veterans who fought against Afghanistan’s
Russian invaders in the 1980s. They received initial guerrilla training
and indoctrination in fundamentalist Islamic doctrines under the
supervision of exiled Arab businessman Osama bin Laden, leader of
the al-Qaida (The Base) terrorist network.
These Afghan veterans continue to provide
spiritual guidance to scores of younger fanatics willing to die for
the creation of a pan-Islamic regime and the embarrassment of the US
and Israeli governments.
Mohammad Jamal Khaliffa, Bin Laden’s
brother-in-law, fronted for al-Qaida in the Philippines, setting up
non-government organizations (NGOs) to court “social
acceptance.”
NGOs identified with the Bin Laden network
include the International Relief and Information Center (IRIC),
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), Daw’l Imam Al
Shafee, the Islamic Students Association of the Philippines Inc. and
the Mercy Foundation of the Philippines. They indulge in legitimate
welfare activities like outreach programs to depressed Muslim
communities especially in Mindanao, medical missions, and
scholarships for Muslim youth.
Donations from legitimate businesses in
neighboring countries like Singapore and Malaysia, including the
Konsanjaya group — whose top officers were all tagged as having
directly or indirectly participated in several urban bombings —
provide the engine for the activities of these NGOs. No data is
available on how much of these donations leak to local armed Muslim
groups, however.
The first Janjalani
Among the first of the Afghanis recruited in
1989 by Khaliffa was slain bandit leader Abdurajak Abubakar
Janjalani, founder of the Al Harakat Al Islamiya or the Abu Sayyaf
Group.
Janjalani earlier received guerrilla training in
Libya and Syria. He was later appointed to the 48-man executive
council of the International Islamic Brigade that fought to free
Afghanistan from the Russians. Returning to Zamboanga City in 1990,
Janjalani was among the first scholars to direct the Muslim faithful
from the traditional tribal perceptions of Islam to the global jihad
thrust of the Shiite Muslims in most Arab countries.
The madaris, Islamic schools, were a useful
venue to propagate extremist Islamic ideals. The general demoralization,
due to guerrilla leader Nur Misuari’s agreeing to a peace pact
with government, also encouraged Muslim youth to resort to
unconventional thinking.
Reserve force
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
likewise provided a rich reserve of potential terrorists. Arab bomb
experts were brought to Camp Abubakar and Bushra, two of the biggest
MILF camps, to train fighters in wire explosives, commando tactics
and guerrilla warfare.
A confidential police intelligence report said
the ASG were also scheduled to receive training in explosives. Ramzi
Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 bombing on the WTC, would have
financed the activity. But he backed out because of impressions,
that ASG guerrillas “had no head except to handle guns.”
The report said Yousef was not confident that
the ASG “might not be able to understand how to handle liquid
bombs,” the favorite weapon of modern terrorists because of the
accessibility of ingredients and the low detection rate by
authorities.
Pinoy hospitality
Khaliffa initially contemplated on setting up
base either in Singapore or Hong Kong, but eventually settled here
“because of the low-standard of living.” A pool of contacts was
also readily available.
“(Bin Laden) and his operatives were able to
utilize the Filipino value of hospitality and by marrying locals. In
this manner, their operatives, especially those coming from the
Middle East or Arab countries were able to establish safe havens in
the Philippines undetected by Philippine authorities,” one report
said.
Marrying locals allowed these foreigners to
acquire property here and these estates hostage Khaliffa and other
prominent terrorists.
“Billeting these visitors in their homes
instead of making hotel accommodations did it. That is why there is
minimal record of these terrorist individuals in the Philippines,”
the report continued.
Influential pals
Being legitimate businessmen, Khaliffa and his
associates were able to come in and out of the country since the
early 1990s without raising the suspicions of the Bureau of
Immigration.
Interrogation on Abdul Hakim Murad — arrested
in the Malate tourist district in 1995 — unraveled for Philippine
authorities the magnitude of the terrorist network operating in
Asia. It also showed that his associates led a affluent life here,
taking diving courses and renting a helicopter at P17,000 per hour
to impress one lady dentist.
Investigations on the activities of suspected
front organizations showed that their contacts reached up to Malacañang
during the time of ousted leader Joseph Estrada through a realtor
identified as Rogelio Martinez. The investigation report did not
indicate if Martinez, president of Realica International, had
knowledge on the other activities of his business partners.
Realica was among the Mindanao-based realty companies
used by al-Qaida front organizations to acquire tracts of land in
Davao City, Agusan del Sur, Pikit and Davao Oriental. Their aim was
to take the land back from Christian settlers encouraged by the
Marcos government to migrate to Mindanao, to muffle the campaign by
secessionist Muslim groups.
Jama’ah Islamiyah
Seven years after the initial detection of the
terrorist network here, many of the original advocates of Islamic
extremism in the Philippines have either been arrested or gone into
hiding. Immigration agents have arrested at least 11 suspected
foreign terrorists since last year, including Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi,
believed to be a key leader of the Malaysia-based Jama’ah
Islamiyah (JI).
Little literature is available on the JI, which
also operates cells in Singapore, although intelligence authorities
believe it has taken on the role abandoned by the al-Qaida in 1995.
Authorities believe direct links between the Abu
Sayyaf and its foreign patrons have been severed, but “clandestine
support is still in place.”
Police Chief Supt. Rodolfo Mendoza, one of
Murad’s interrogators, cautioned against lapsing to laxity.
“We have to realize the consistency and
persistency of Islamic extremism. Their plan is based on fanatical
and meticulous planning. And being fanatical, they will always
execute the nature of their struggle,” he said.
In an assessment paper, Sr. Supt. Rodolfo
Jazmines Garcia said: “The situation threatens to go out of hand
with improper handling. We must recognize the gravity of the
situation and restructure our capability accordingly.”
Mendoza said it is easy to forecast other
attacks here and elsewhere in the globe because of the terrorist
organizations’ capacity for long-term planning, and the threat of
losing potential recruits if they fail to maintain the momentum
gained by the Sept. 11 attacks.
Mendoza observed that the Philippines, being the
only Catholic state in Asia, is an obvious target for terrorists
dreaming of a pan-Islamic regime.
“We have to realign our thoughts and deeds to
ensure the sustainability of our anti-terror efforts,” he said.
“Attitude change is needed. We have to do things not for promotion
and to impress other people, but because we have to.”
(To be continued)
|
