|
By Johnna Villaviray, Reporter
Second of 3 parts
(Because terrorism has deep roots in the
Philippines, it spawned a number of terrorist plots aimed at targets
here and abroad. This installment points up the failure of
authorities to give serious attention to or completely ignore the
intelligence gathered from or left behind by terrorist plotters.)
WHEN smoke and acrid fumes escaped from Unit 603
of the Josefa Apartments in Malate in 1995, responding fire and
police authorities expected a blaze. Instead, they stumbled on the
first bits of evidence that Muslim fanatics are plotting to crash
commercial airliners on a US landmark and to “harass” different
embassies in Manila.
Six years later, Sept. 11 happened.
Last March, a suspected al-Qaida operative
arrested in Oman and now under US custody claimed that the terrorist
network was planning to bomb the US and Israeli embassies here.
Philippine police and defense authorities could
not directly link the information supplied by Mohammad Mansour
Jabarah — a Canadian of Kuwaiti descent — to the plot uncovered
in 1995. The police intelligence officer who processed information
gathered from the Josefa Apartments raid acknowledged, however, that
Jabarah’s story appear to be a modification of the plan drawn up
by Muslim radicals in the early 1990s.
“They’re obsessed with executing their plan.
It doesn’t matter if it takes years, they just make
modifications,” Chief Supt. Rodolfo Mendoza said in an interview.
Mendoza said it may be difficult to directly
link Jabarah’s claim to the earlier plot, but added that
authorities must use all available data to ensure that the country
is not exposed to a terrorist assault.
Mountain of information
A mountain of data has been available to local
and foreign police and defense authorities to prevent attacks by
Muslim radicals. The information is not always appreciated as much
as they should have been, though.
In a report submitted in an intelligence summit
called by Malacañang last January, Mendoza said the information
obtained in 1995 “could have prevented last year’s bombing of
the World Trade Center in the US if only pursuit and follow-up
operations were conducted.”
But not all of the information gleaned from the
January 1995 raid was wasted.
The operation gave Philippine police their first
glimpse of a terrorist underworld that plotted to assassinate
Philippine government officials, foreign diplomats and prominent
businessmen, as well as to bomb high-profile targets.
Computer files and the interrogation of Abdul
Hakim Murad, one of the occupants of Unit 603, allowed authorities
to thwart the assassination of the Pope and helped expose Oplan
Bojinka.
Bojinka, a Yugoslav word for “boom” or
“bang,” called for the hijacking of 11 US-bound commercial
airliners from Asia carrying bombs set to explode in unison. Police
later realized that the 1994 bombing of a Japan-bound Philippine
Airlines flight was in fact a dry run to test the feasibility of the
plan.
Sweeping arrests
Armed with the information, the police made
sweeping raids in Metro Manila, Bulacan and Davao City, yielding a
catch of 30 suspected foreign terrorists. The suspects carried
Pakistani, Jordanian, Omani, Syrian, Palestinian, Iraqi, Sudanese
and Saudi passports.
Much later, information from the operation was
used to trace al-Qaida operatives like Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind
of the WTC bombing in 1993; and Amien Mohammad, an official of
Malaysia-based firm Konsanjaya was identified as fronting for the
terrorist network.
The Philippines promptly shared all the
information with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Manila
since a number of the targets involved US interests.
Information obtained from the laptop computer
left in the apartment showed that several Middle Eastern men were
taking flight lessons in the US. There was also a plan to blow up an
unnamed nuclear site but the information was not passed on the
federal agency that overseas nuclear facilities or to the plants
themselves until years later.
“I believe they acted on it, they didn’t
ignore. I just don’t know why they didn’t prevent Sept. 11.
Maybe it’s human lapses,” Mendoza said, hinting that US
authorities might have focused on the hijackings.
But in an interview with a foreign news agency,
police intelligence chief Robert Delfin said US authorities might
have overlooked and “didn’t appreciate the info coming from the
Philippine police.”
Failing to give the data should not be blamed
solely on the Americans, though.
Oblivious intelligence community
Mendoza’s report acknowledged that the local
intelligence community “have remained oblivious to the changes”
in the demands of national security.
“Thirty years ago, the main concern of all
intelligence agencies in the country is that threat posed by the
Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm the New
People’s Army as well as the secessionist movement in the Southern
Philippines. Since then, many developments have occurred and many
changes have evolved not only in the kinds of enemies we have but
also in the requirements of the decision makers to aid them in their
role towards good governance,” the report said.
The report blamed the lack of resources and
policy direction, outdated methods of data gathering and the lack of
qualified personnel for the decline in the quality of intelligence
output here.
“Most of the well-trained intelligence leaders
and personnel of the Intelligence Community in the last 10 years
have long since transferred to other units or sought more lucrative
jobs. The new replacements that are mostly untrained, have still yet
to obtain intelligence training from seasoned veterans of the
intelligence community,” the report observed.
It didn’t help that most of the time, “the
replacements are being taken from the roster of lower ranked
military/police personnel instead of recruiting suitable and
qualified personnel from the civilian sector.”
Mendoza said it was understandable that most
young talents are not interested to join the police force.
“Being with the private sector would easily
pay them more than triple of what they’d get if they joined us,”
he said.
The report also hinted at a general
demoralization in the ranks over the misuse of intelligence
“gathered against certain personalities for the use of politicians
who are in power.”
For the past years, reports of illegal
wiretapping and surveillance of public officials and civilians have
been reported by the media.
A controversial case involved then police chief
and now Sen. Panfilo Lacson when a secret roomful of sophisticated
equipment was discovered inside Camp Crame, headquarters of the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
Legislators raised alarm that the Estrada
administration was gathering political dirt on the opposition.
Lacson turned the tables last year, accusing the Macapagal-Arroyo
government of using the military’s intelligence service to link
him to an international drug-trafficking syndicate.
Intelligence misused
Mendoza said today is not the time to use the
intelligence service for individual or partisan needs, noting that
this exposes the country to terrorist attacks, which are likely to
be launched by local cell members considering the public’s general
distrust on Arab-looking foreigners.
Another police official said the PNP had been on
“heightened but silent alert” since last week to prevent a
possible assault in time for the anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks
in the US.
“We received raw information that they (local
terrorist cells) would launch a terror operation, like bomb malls or
churches. We didn’t want to alarm the public so we kept quiet
about it. But the threat is real,” the official said.
The official said the attack might not be of the
same magnitude as the
Mendoza underscored the need to sustain
vigilance against the terrorist threat, but acknowledged that
government might not have enough resources. The report said one way
to save on financial resources was to abandon missions that are no
longer relevant.
“But we have to keep on the fight, because
they will continue what they started. We also have to maintain the
momentum because they would not care how long they wait or how many
die as long as they get what they want. We can’t let them,”
Mendoza said.
(To be continued)
First part
| Conclusion
|
