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By Annie Ruth C. Sabangan
, Senior Reporter
(Conclusion)
EDSA 2 proved civil society’s capability to
demand accountability from its leaders. Analysts, however, believe
Philippine democracy remains in crisis. For if not, EDSA 3—which
saw the clamor of the masses for change (whether they were
identified with Joseph Estrada or not is immaterial)—would never
have happened at all.
Beneath the images of Estrada and Arroyo and the
people being hastily lumped either as pro-GMA-EDSA 2 or pro-Erap-EDSA
3, both groups—EDSA 2’s organized basic sectors (e.g., farmers
and workers) and the non-ideologue masses (largely from the
urban-poor sector) of EDSA 3—wanted change in the government that
would effectively meet the demands of the poor majority.
In fact, the clamor of the masses at EDSA 2 and
EDSA 3 may not be different at all. Both wanted to empower the poor.
However, although political power was taken from an adjunct of the
elite through EDSA 2, elite democracy was again legitimated.
Unmet needs and demands of the poor and the
continuous incapacity of the government to heed the people’s call
create what the political analyst Joel Rocamora calls “democratic
deficit.”
With the continued dominance of the traditional
political parties (personality-based, devoid of programmatic
ideologies and platforms and based on particularistic interests) in
the May election, it is very unlikely that the people’s clamor for
a genuine democratic representation through the ballot and, of
course, through governance would be addressed. Thus, Rocamora
believes democratic deficit would linger.
One of the solutions to the vicious circle of an
electoral process producing democracy only for the elite is through
“the creation of more effective and cohesive political parties,
oriented to programmatic rather than particularistic goals, policy
rather than pork,” according to Rocamora, executive director of
the Institute of Popular Democracy.
He said institutional reforms of both the
representational and electoral systems are needed to help the
country “construct a democracy able to offer benefits for all.”
Mandate-delegate
Rocamora’s idea of democratizing the electoral
system is somewhat similar to the key notions of classic democratic
theory. In his book, Ideals and Ideologies of Modern Politics, the
political science professor Mark N. Hagopian explained the
theory’s advocacies: 1) majority rule in the sense that public
policy should somehow reflect the will of the majority of citizens
and 2) maximum public participation in the sense that it is the
right and duty of all citizens to get involved in elections, public
discussions and other aspects of the political process.
Specifically, Rocamora’s idea resembles the
democratic concept of “mandate-delegate” theory—or the idea of
having an electoral representative serving as an agent or mouthpiece
for those he represents and bound to express the wishes of his
constituents—as opposed to a representative elected on the basis
of popularity, political and/or economic influence.
Parliamentary shift
An attempt to open channels of electoral
participation by unclogging traditionally elitist and
personality-based parties similar to the mandate-delegate theory was
in fact already made through the party-list system. As explained by
Dr. Julio Teehankee, chair of the De La Salle University political
science department: the party-list system was “an attempt to shift
the focus from personalities to political parties.”
The party-list system, however, proved to be
just a political token, since elected party-list groups were allowed
to occupy only 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives, with a single party allowed to occupy only up to
three seats.
Closing the democratic deficit through the
electoral process requires at least two structural reforms,
according to Rocamora: change in the present representational
structure and change in electoral structures.
Changes in representational structure would be
done through a shift from presidential to parliamentary government,
in which the executive is elected from within the ranks of the
ruling party in parliament and can be removed through a vote of no
confidence.
A shift to parliamentary government would
accomplish several things, according to Rocamora. “It will lessen
the powers of an altogether too powerful president and shift power
to the ruling party and to parliament as a whole.”
“Coordination of policymaking through the
ruling party would not only facilitate legislation but also produce
better laws and greater coherence in the government’s
decisionmaking as a whole. A shift to the parliamentary government
should therefore encourage the creation of a more programmatic and
more organizationally solid political parties,” he adds.
Teehankee agrees. “Given the Philippine
experience with presidentialism, it is but logical to advocate a
shift to the parliamentary government in order to induce
programmatic, responsive and responsible political parties.” This,
he says, is consistent with the argument of the proponents of
constitutional reforms that “programmatic and ideological
political parties tend to flourish under a parliamentary
government.”
Teehankee suggests, however, that the shift
should be done simultaneously with the creation of corresponding
parties. Without these parties, occurrences of “cronyism,
short-term policy planning, the management of ad-hoc coalitions by
the government and the deficient orientation to the collective
good” may persist.
But the shift should not be done hastily, he
cautions. It must be done incrementally, beginning with
“microlevel” or through legislative reforms, then at the
“mesolevel” or through electoral reforms and finally through the
“macrolevel” or constitutional reforms.
Party list: half in the House, all in the
Senate
Rocamora also believes that parliamentarism is
not the absolute cure to strengthening and democratizing the present
elitist structure of political parties. He says other countries that
are under parliamentary rule also produce weak parties.
Thus he offers the second solution of changing
the electoral structure to remold political parties. This must be
done by expanding the existing party-list system in which party-list
groups would occupy half of the House seats and 100 percent of the
Senate. The system would also be revised by adopting the concept of
proportional representation (PR) being done in Europe, which
“pushes elections away from personal contests and toward party
contests.”
The present three-seat limit of a single
party-list group should also be abolished, according to Rocamora,
since the PR system “should encourage the consolidation rather
than the fragmentation of political parties.”
To prevent the formation of pseudo-party-list
groups, or those that just serve as extension of elite parties and
do not represent marginalized sectors, Rocamora suggested that the
“two-percent threshold be retained.”
Breaking the old elitist parties by
strengthening the party-list system where voters choose between
parties instead of personalities, “will lessen the intensity of
personal and clan contests which are the main source of violence and
money politics,” Rocamora said.
Also, since votes would no longer be based on
the person but on the party, “parties would be required to
strengthen their organizational and programmatic requirements for
electoral victory.”
In the meantime, while such proposals are
encountering roadblocks in the government, Rocamora hopes civil
society would further strengthen—to the point not only of
demanding accountability from retrograde leaders—as in EDSA 1 and
EDSA 2—but of preventing the ascension of another.
Part 1 |
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