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By Lakambini A. Sitoy, Reporter
Last of four parts
Some of the test categories in which Mega
Pacific’s machines appeared to have an edge over Total Information
Management (TIM) were:
1. An uninterrupted power system
2. The ability of the machine to read two-sided
ballots in one pass
3. The ability to detect previously counted
ballots and prevent them from being counted more than once.
4. Storage of results by precinct in external
storage device
5. Encryption of the data in this external
storage device
6. Speed of the CPU
7. Production of a soft copy of the results
8. Generation of an audit trail in a soft copy
9. Consolidation of results from all precincts
using the encrypted soft copy of the data stored on an external
device
10. One hundred-percent accuracy.
When the Department of Science and Technology
delivered these results, the tests performed on the TIM machines
were not enough to determine their performance capacity. On the
table submitted by that government agency, the words “Note: This
particular requirement needs further verification” appear within
the box for the test results of the TIM machines. Nonetheless the
Comelec made the award to Mega Pacific.
Both bidders said the machines failed in several
key requirements, the first of which was the accuracy rating of the
counting machines. In the Comelec’s request for proposal, this was
pegged at 99.9995 percent, a figure set by a private-sector group
with the Comelec, according to Elections Commissioner Borra in an
oral presentation to the Supreme Court.
For some reason, the accuracy rating the DOST
tested for was merely 99.995 percent. The machines of both bidders
passed this lower standard.
The question remained why the machines had not
been tested more scrupulously and why the Comelec had apparently
modified its stringent criteria, resulting in the accommodation of
Mega Pacific.
Another crucial requirement was the ability of
the programs (software) in both machines to detect previously
downloaded precinct results and prevent these from being inputted
again into the System. Both bidders failed.
“We are thus confronted with the grim prospect
of election fraud on a massive scale by means of just a few key
strokes,” the Supreme Court said in its decision annulling the
automation contract.
The printing of an audit trail was considered a
mandatory feature of an automated system, in accordance with the
Comelec’s request for proposal. Its purpose is to enable the
Comelec to trace the identities of the operators of the automated
counting machines (ACMs) responsible for data entry and downloading,
as well as the times when the various data were downloaded into the
canvassing system, in order to forestall fraud and to identify its
perpetrators in the event.
This requirement was not a mere “formality,”
according to the Supreme Court. And yet the Comelec decided to
forgive Mega Pacific’s inability to fulfill it.
Validity of technical evaluation
What remains unresolved to this day is whether
Mega Pacific’s machine failures were on account of software or
machine defects.
“If software, how was it determined that the
machines could actually be re-programmed and thereby rectified?”
Justice Panganiban asked in the Court decision he wrote. “Did a
qualified technical expert read and analyze the source code for the
programs and conclude that these could be saved and remedied? . . .
Who was this qualified technical expert? When did he carry out the
study? . . . And if indeed a qualified expert reviewed the source
code, did he also determine how much work would be needed to rectify
the programs?
“After the rectification process, who would
ascertain and how would it be ascertained that the programs have
indeed been properly rectified, and that they would work properly
thereafter? . . . And would [it] be in time for the elections
in 2004?”
Tests continued at the DOST late into 2003. On
October 8 to 13 that year, a new evaluation was made of 285 SK C and
C counting machines imported from Korea. Since an initial batch
delivered had included a high percentage of machines that had failed
the tests, the DOST was asked to test every single ACM arriving at
the Comelec. Some of these units had failed previous tests but had
later been re-tested and passed.
These tests pertained to the hardware, however,
and did not address the software failings.
Commissioner Borra, in an appearance before the
Supreme Court, had said the Mega Pacific software on which the
decision to award the contract had been awarded, was merely a
“demo” version. The final version that would actually be used in
the elections was still being developed, even by that time. No
one beyond Mega Pacific Consortium had seen it yet.
“Why is it that the machines are already being
brought in and paid for, when there is as yet no way of knowing if
the final version of the software would be able to run them
properly? . . . There is an adage that is still valid to this
day: “Garbage in, garbage out.” No matter how powerful,
advanced and sophisticated the computers and the servers are, if the
software being used is defective or has been compromised, the
results will be no better than garbage,” the Court said.
An aura of mystery now surrounds the process of
evaluating the fitness of the counting machines.
“Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST
fail to divulge in what manner and by what standards or criteria the
condition, performance and/or readiness of the machines were
reevaluated and reappraised and thereafter given the passing
mark,” the Court said.
Still, the job of the DOST was simply to
objectively evaluate the counting machines. To determine whether
they passed the Comelec’s criteria would be up to the Bids and
Awards Committee.
The Manila Times called up the office of Rolando
T. Viloria, an engineer and chair of the Metals Industry Research
and Development Center of the DOST.
Viloria, head of the DOST technical evaluation
committee, said through his executive assistant that the person to
speak with would be Commissioner
Resurrección Borra: “It would be better that
the Comelec answer all queries pertaining to the issue.”
A source at the DOST says the documents on the
automated machine tests were public and available for scrutiny in
the weeks after the
DOST delivered its December 15, 2003, report on
the fitness of the machines.
But the test results and all other documents
were turned over to the Comelec sometime in the first quarter of
2004 and declared confidential, said the source.
The DOST has, in effect, sought to disengage
itself from the mess.
Part 1 |Part
2 |Part 3 |
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