WHEN the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, the United States emerged as the sole superpower in the world. A group of neo-conservatives (or neocons) also sprouted during this period that had great influence on US defense policy, as exemplified by the defense strategy they have formulated. The gist of their thinking is contained in what is now referred to as the Wolfowitz Doctrine: “Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, which poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. . . While the US cannot become the world’s policeman, by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations. (Paul Wolfowitz – Defense Strategy for the 1990s, 1994)”