The coming US withdrawal from Afghanistan
Ahead of the 2014 drawdown of US troops from Afghanistan, efforts will intensify to negotiate a settlement that gives the Taliban a place in a new government.

The Taliban could make organizational shifts to highlight their political role. Depending on progress made in the negotiations, the organization could establish a formal political arm to represent the Taliban’s Mullah Omar-led leadership in future power-sharing talks. The United States could offer some acknowledgement of the Taliban’s political status and exploit the Taliban’s increased interest in foreign investment to extract guarantees from the group on neutralizing transnational jihadist activity. At the same time, the United States will focus heavily on trying to find successors to Afghan President Hamid Karzai to keep a check on Taliban power.

The negotiations will face numerous obstacles this year. There will be an upsurge in violence — both in terms of officially sanctioned attacks designed to gain advantage on the negotiating table and spoiler attacks by Taliban elements allied with al Qaeda on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border.

Moreover, Pakistan faces a politically distracting year. Parliamentary polls are scheduled for 2013, marking the first time that a duly elected democratic government will have completed its term and transferred power to a new civilian government without interference. In the fall, the military leadership will also be reshuffled. The balance of power within the civilian and military forces likely will be maintained in this transition and thus no major divergences in domestic or foreign policy are expected. The emerging military leadership is already engaged with the United States in the negotiations for a settlement in Afghanistan. But the complexity of the talks and the political sensitivities surrounding the election period will give Islamabad a rationale for holding out on the more contentious points of the negotiations, especially as Pakistan struggles to manage domestic militant backlash against the negotiations.

Washington’s intention to reduce its presence in the region will spur regional actors to fill the void.

Pakistan will increase its interactions with Russia, Central Asia and Iran to prepare for a post-US Afghanistan. India, sharing regional concerns about Islamist militancy spreading from Afghanistan, will also be more engaged with these regional stakeholders to preserve its still-limited economic and diplomatic presence in the region and buttress itself against the inevitable rise in instability emanating from southwest Asia. India and Pakistan will remain wary of each other’s intentions but will use a slow-moving normalization process to stay abreast of each other’s plans for Afghanistan and prevent tensions from erupting.

India’s balancing act
India will also turn its attention eastward, where the United States is quietly trying to forge a coalition of regional partners to keep a check on China in the Indo-Pacific basin. Myanmar in particular will be an active battleground for influence this year. India will avoid formal alignments but will find common cause with Japan, Australia and Southeast Asian nations that will allow Japan to expand its economic, political and security relations in the area. India does not want a confrontation with China, nor is it looking to tie itself to US foreign policy in the region when it comes to issues like China or Iran. As with Pakistan, India will expend some energy on the diplomatic front to normalize its relationship with Beijing and help mitigate any tensions that arise from this underlying regional competition.

Among the Indian people, the country’s economic slowdown and increasing energy needs are a higher priority than its foreign policy concerns. As the opposition tries to unite under a new leadership ahead of 2014 elections, it will be battling with the ruling minority United Progressive Alliance government at the regional level in preparation for the polls.