Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez might be at death’s door, and how his successors manage the looming transition could influence the future of left-wing politics across Latin America.

While the politics of Venezuela are just that—the politics of a single nation-state subject to its own national character and circumstances—Chavez has become the face of leftism in the region, and the impact of his eventual departure remains in question.

Chavez took power in 1999 after a decade of economic malaise and political instability in Venezuela. The populist-leftist leader vowed that the country’s oil riches would be shared with the poor, and he largely has kept his promise. Indeed, Venezuela’s social and political systems have changed radically since Chavez took office. He rejected the conventional wisdom of the preceding governments, appointed his own ministers, relied on the counsel of Cuba’s Fidel Castro and began using state influence to increase control over the oil sector. Despite his many critics, Chavez is still the most popular politician in Venezuela due to both his redistributive policies and his persona.

But Venezuela’s economic system is very fragile, so Chavez’s successors would be forced to bear the burdens of the tough fiscal challenges facing the country. Much in the way that Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon was forced to devalue his country’s currency immediately after succeeding former President Carlos Salinas Gortari in 1994, triggering what became known as the Tequila Crisis, Venezuela’s next president may have to devalue the boliviano or severely restrict fiscal expenditures, especially in light of the increase in social spending during the recent lengthy electoral campaign. But while Mexico generally has had the United States as an ally during tough financial times, Venezuela largely has isolated itself and lacks international guarantors.

Over the past year, investors have reacted to news of Chavez’s illness by investing heavily in the national oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, driving up the worth of its bonds and allowing the country to borrow off its value. The possibility of a messy transition in Caracas could reduce that optimism, and Venezuela would face a true crisis if its new leadership relied too heavily on high government spending to ensure popular support. As demonstrated by a series of refinery fires and infrastructure failures in 2012, even the basic foundations for commerce in Venezuela have become dilapidated. Recovering from this state would require significant, politically unpopular adjustments, but Chavez’s apparently imminent exit would likely leave the country without a strong leader to implement them.

The departure of Chavez and the possible collapse of the system he created would mark the end of an era in Latin America. Since taking office, Chavez has been a vocal, iconic leader in the international system. He sent supplies to Iran in violation of international sanctions and made enormous weapons purchases from Russia. He played on Cold War themes, developing a close relationship with Cuba, allying with Russia and accusing the United States of actively undermining Venezuelan stability. Though not strictly Marxist, the Bolivarian brand of socialism pioneered by Chavez has shaped the conversation in Latin America and paved the way for a post-Cold War approach to populism. With the weight of Venezuela’s oil industry behind him, Chavez gained a level of influence that Cuba, for example, can no longer exert.

There are also tangible aspects of Chavez’s role as leader of the far left in Latin America, most notably Venezuela’s annual provision of billions of dollars worth of discounted oil to Cuba, among other countries. Those shipments have become incredibly important for the island nation, where oil production has stagnated and recent offshore drilling hopes have been dashed. Without subsidized Venezuelan oil, Cuba would be forced to make rapid changes to its Marxist structure that it may not be ready to execute for some time. In Cuba, even the possibility of an absence of sponsorship raises the specter of the desperate poverty that beset the country after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Chavez has been a key driver of ideological splits in the region, and Venezuela has punched well above its weight internationally. This is partly due to Chavez’s oil diplomacy, as well as his ability to articulate a post-Cold War approach to the enduring challenge of wealth distribution in the resource-rich but infrastructure-poor region. Without Chavez, and with the possibility of a deterioration in Venezuela, the positions of ideological center and right factions in Latin America— from Chile to Brazil to Mexico— would improve. Political changes tend to come alongside economic crises, and the evolution of leftism in the region will be heavily influenced by external forces such as commodity markets and investor confidence. Reflecting past political waves in Latin America, Chavez’s passing could trigger a deep reconsideration of the role of government in the region.